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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C:TATF: OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 19132 
JAKP. POTEET, a/k/a ELMER LAVERN 
POTF:F:T, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Jake Poteet, appeals his convictions of 
Aggcavated Assault, a thicd degcee felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-103 (1978), and Bail 
Jumping, a thicd degcee felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
76-8-312 ( 1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In a jucy tcial held Febcuacy 28, 1983 and Macch 1, 
"983 in the Sixth Judicial Distcict Couct of Gacfield County, 
State of Utah, the Honocable Don V. Tibbs, Judge, pcesiding, 
appellant was tcied on chacges of Aggcavated Assault, 
Aggtavated Robbecy, and Attempted Cciminal Homicide. The jucy 
found appellant guilty of Aggcavated Assault. In a sepacate 
luty tcial held Macch 11, 1983 in the same couct, appellant 
was found guilty of Bail Jumping. On Macch 31, 1983, 
appellant was sentenced foe each of the above offenses to 
serve consecutive terms of not more than five yeaL-s in th<: 
Utah State Prison and to pay a fine of SS,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was convicted of Aggravated Assault for 
the brutal beating of Rodney Jones in a motel room in 
Escalante, Utah on Halloween weekend in 1981. 
The victim, Rodney Jones, was a mechanic for Lamb 
Engineering & Construction Company, working near Escalante 
(Tl. 122, 277) .1 The victim received his weekly paycheck in 
the amount of $765.67 on the afternoon of Friday, October 30, 
1981 and cashed the paycheck that same afternoon at the Bank 
of Iron County in Escalante (Tl. 123-129, 277-278, 391). 
Because his pickup truck was not running properly, Jones took 
a room at the Circle "D" Motel in Escalante instead of 
returning to his home in Arizona (Tl. 137, 280, 302-303). 
1 The transcripts and records shall be referred to as 
follows: "Tl."--transcript of trial of case no. 2914 he::.n 
February 28 and March 1, 1983; "T2."--transcript of tria::. of 
case no. 2985 held March 4, 1983; "T3." transcript of 
Arraignment and Preliminary Hearing foL case no. 108 
December 9, 1982; "T4."--transcr:ipt of Arraignment and 
Preliminary Hearing for case no. 109 a::.so held December 9' 
1982; "T5."--transcript of Ar:raignment foL- case nos. 82-92 
held November 25, 1981; "Rl."--record of case no. 2914; an<l 
"R2."--record of case no. 298S. 
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The nexl day, Oclober 31, 1981, Jones apparently 
telephoned Larry Poleel, appellant's cousin (T2. 105), and 
asked Larry lo help him repair his pickup truck (Tl. 292, 300, 
11s, 452). Larey was wocking as a mechanic at an Escalante 
gas slalion (Tl. 452). Larey testified that he went over to 
the Circle "D" Motel at appcoximately noon on Saturday, 
October- 31, 1981 and worked on the victim's truck for an hour 
(Tl. 453-454). Larry related that after they finished, Jones 
invited him into his motel coom for a few drinks (Tl. 
454-455). As Lacry was about to leave, appellant and his 
bcothers Gary and Billy drove up, apparently having noticed 
Lacey's pickup truck parked in the motel parking lot. Jones 
invited them in. Larry testified that they all drank beer and 
laughed. After a few minutes, Larry left. Appellant, Gary, 
and Billy left approximately ten minutes later (Tl. 456-457). 
Appellant and his brothers went to the Apache 
Lounge, a bar, in Escalante just before 2 :00 p.m. on October 
31, 1981 (Tl. 236). Appellant's uncle, John Poteet, met them 
at the bac (Tl. 475). A few hours later, appellant and his 
bcothers were involved in a disturbance at the bar (Tl. 
237-238, 320). The owner of the bar, Joseph Schow, persuaded 
them to leave (Tl. 239). 
The four Poteets then returned to the Circle "D" 
Motel (Tl. 201, 212, 369-370, 475). Appellant parked his 
Pick up truck in front of Room 1, narrowly missing the open 
door of a pickup truck owned by Gary Bruno (Tl. 212-213). The 
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Poteets got out of their pickup truck and began hattassing 
Bruno and his friends Teri:y Thayne and Dennis BaLnes (Tl. 20J, 
213). Appellant did most of the talking, calling Btuno "gav" 
and "queer" because Bruno had long hait (Tl. 213-214, 
220-222). Appellant said they were looking foe some 
construction guy staying at the motel. Appellant also said 
something about harming a local policeman named Mosier (Tl. 
215). Thayne and Barnes testified that appellant and the 
other Poteets appeared to have been dcinking (Tl. 203, 214). 
Appellant and the other Poteets then drove down to 
the other end of the motel and packed their pickup truck out 
in the middle of the parking lot in front of Room 12, which 
was Jones's room (Tl. 136, 139, 20fi-207 , 216-217, 404). The 
Poteets got out of the pickup truck, left both ti:uck doors 
open, and went into Room 12 and brutally assaulted Jones (Tl. 
140, 218-219, 322-323, 367). Jones testified at trial that he 
only remembers lying on his bed and seeing four men standing 
over him, beating him (Tl. 281, 298, 305). One of the 
assailants told Jones, "We'd better not heat: any moi:e about 
this or we'll get you" (Tl. 286). The assault left Jones 
unconscious (Tl. 282, 3fi3, 422). 
Shortly thereafter, at approximately 5:15 p.m. on 
October 31. 1981, Officec Donald Mosier saw the Poteets parked 
in front of the Apache Lounge (Tl. 323). Officer Mosier had 
been informed of the earlier disturbance in the bar involvinq 
the Poteets (Tl. 320-321). He told the Poteets that the 
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haLmaid did nol wanl them in the bac anymoce (Tl. 322-323, 
173). Appellanl ceplied, "I have a 30-30 which will take cace 
,,f you" (Tl. 324). Offic<=c Mosiec testifed that the Poteet's 
apptat<=d lo be intoxicated (Tl. 324). 
Appcoximalely an houc and half latec, Joseph Schow, 
th<= own<=r of the bac saw appellant, his two brothecs, and his 
uncle standing in front of their pickup truck outside the bar 
and overh<=ard appellant say to his uncle, "We God Damn sure 
tor<= that coom up, TV and all" (Tl. 240-248). Schow went to 
find Offic<=c Mosier to cepoct what he had heard (Tl. 247). 
At approximately the same time on the evening of 
Octob<=r 31, 1981, the owners of the Ciccle "D" Motel, Joy and 
Danny Reid, noticed on the switchboacd that the telephone 
light for Room 12 was on, indicating that the phone was off 
th<= hook (Tl. 142, 156, 170, 192-196). The telephone in Room 
12 did not work for outside calls (Tl. 137, 192). Joy Reid 
looked out and saw that Room 12 was dack (Tl. 143). The Reids 
to wait until the next mocning to check into the 
matter further, thinking that Jones was eithec out of his room 
or asleep (Tl. 143, 170-171). 
The next day, Sunday, November 1, 1981, at 
appt·oximately 11:00 a.m., the cleaning girls told Joy Rein 
that lhey were unable to clean Room 12 since Jones was still 
inside (Tl. 144). Joy walked down to Room 12 and knocked. 
The t e was no ces ponse. She knocked again. Th is time she 
h<=ard a muller-. She opened the unlocked door and saw Jones 
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lying on the bed cove red with blood. She also saw that 
television set was on the floor and that the hed had 
broken (Tl. 144, 159). Frightened, Joy ran back to the 
motel's office lo gel her husband, Danny (Tl. 148, 160, 166, 
171). 
Danny Reid went to Room 12 with his wife Joy, and 
saw Jones lying on the bed with blood all around (Tl. 149, 
171-172).2 Danny returned quickly to the office to gel his 
Kodak Inslamatic lo take photographs for insurance purposes 
(Tl. 146-147, 150, 172-173). After Danny took the 
photographs, Jones told Danny that he, Jones, knew who had 
assaulted him, but Jones did not tell Danny who it was (Tl. 
179, 182-183). Danny went to get Officer Mosier (Tl. 149, 
184). Joy had gone to telephone an Emergency Medical 
Technician {"E.M.T.") {T2. 149, 188, 32R, 408). 
Danny located Officer Mosier at chut-ch al 
approximately 11:45 a.m., November 1, 1981 and told him of the 
assault {Tl. 150, 186, 325, 376). Mosier went home and put on 
his uniform, and Danny returned to the mole:!. (Tl. 3 26). When 
Danny arrived back at Jones' s room, Jones was on his and 
knees looking for a $100.00 bill he had hidden in the zippered 
compartment of his money belt (Tl. 186-187, 198, 282-284). 
2 There was blood on the television set, the mirror, the 
carpel, the bedding, the pillows, the air: conditioner, the 
walls, and the ceiling as well as on the victim (T2. 144-145. 
15 0-151 ' 16 2-16 3 ' 16 6 ' 171-1 7 2 ' 191. 2 5 s ' 3 27 ' 3 8 4- 3 8 6 ) . 
Before the assault, Room 12 had been neat and orderly (Tl. 
145, 158, 200, 211-212) 
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Danny helped Jones back onto the bed (Tl. 187). The money 
belt was offered into evidence at trial (Tl. 283). The 
stitching ai:ound the zippered money compartment had been 
ripped apart (Tl. 284). The $100.00 bill was never found (Tl. 
18 7). 
Officer Mosier arrived at the motel just before 
noon, November 1, 1981 (Tl. 376). Mosier, a certified E.M.T. 
(Tl. 408), entered Jones's blood-splattered room and examined 
Jones. Mosiei: testified at trial that Jones's pulse was weak 
and his breathing was shallow. Mosier furthei: testified that 
Jones had a deep cut over his left eye, a bloody nose, and 
dded blood in his mouth, ears, haic, and beard (Tl. 327, 345, 
406). Mosier asked Jones if he knew who had assaulted him. 
Jones replied affirmatively. Mosier asked Jones to tell him 
who it was. Jones was reluctant (Tl. 328). Jones faded in 
and out of consciousness (Tl. 328-329, 345). When Jones 
became coherent again, Mosier repeated his questions (Tl. 
329). Jones again was reluctant but finally told Mosier that 
the Poteets had assaulted him and robbed him of $600.00 to 
$650.00 (Tl. 329, 349, 360). Mosier found Jones's empty 
wallet in Jones's pants pocket (Tl. 316, 360, 400). 
Officec Mosier went immediately to the Poteet's 
rented home. Re did not obtain a warrant foe theic arrest 
because he feared that Jones would soon die or lose 
consciousness from his injuries (Tl. 343-345). Mosier's feac 
was based on his observation of Jones's shallow bceathing, 
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weak pulse, and vacila ting cohenence, and on the amount of 
blood splatter-ea thcoughout Jones' s motel coom (Tl. 130, 
343-345, 3Rfi, 406). Officer- Mosier- also believed that 
appellant and the other Poteets wece ti:ansients living in 
Escalante only temporadly and that as such they might leave 
town before he could obtain a war-cant (Tl. 343-345; TS. 11). 
Mos ie c ac rived at the Poteet ces ide nee be tween 12 
noon and 12:30 p.m., Sunday, November 1, 1981, and asked 
appellant, his uncle John, and his brothecs Gary and Billy to 
come outside to answer some questions (Tl. 330-333, 349-350, 
478). Mosier read them their Micanda eights and each 
individually responded that he under-stood and was willing to 
talk (Tl. 333-336, 351-352). Mosier- informed them of Jones's 
accusation. The Poteets denied involvement, but agceed to go 
with Officer Mosier to the Circle "D" Motel to see whether 
Jones could identify them (Tl. 337, 352-354). Mosier- anested 
the four- men for questioning then dcove them to the motel 
338, 340-343, 403). 
While Officer- Mosier- was at the Poteet residence, 
Carl Davis, an E.M.T. and a Peace Officer- Catagory II (Tl. 
252-253, 270-272, 410) arcived at the Ciccle "D" Motel to 
attend to Jones' s injucies (Tl. 149, Fil, 254, 355). Davis, 
at trial, described Jones as "one bloody mess" (Tl. 254). 
Davis cleaned the dried blood from Jones's mouth, nose, and 
eyes with a wacm towel to help Jones's bceathing (Tl. 
255-256). 
-8-
When Mosier arrived back at the motel with the 
poteets, Davis told Mosier that Jones needed to be taken to 
the hospital,3 Mosier asked Davis to stay a minute (Tl. 
258-259). Mosier had the Poteets line up in front of the 
motel's swimming pool fence directly across from Room 12, 
handed his backup revolver to Davis, and went to assist Jones 
to the door of his motel room (Tl. 152-153, 165, 189, 259-260, 
266-267, 287-288, 338, 355-356, 396, 479). Officer Mosier 
asked Jones if he recognized any of the men as his assailants. 
Jones said, "yes", and pointed to Billy Poteet. Mosier asked 
Jones if any of the others were involved. Jones replied, 
"those two," pointing to appellant and Gary. Jones said he 
recognized only those three (Tl. 287-289, 292-294, 339, 
356-358, 397-399, 403).4 Mosier asked Jones whom he 
recognized as his assailants several times in different ways 
in an effort to confuse Jones. Jones's identification of 
appellant, Billy, and Gary was consistent throughout the 
questioning (Tl. 339-340, 359, 398-399). 
Officer Mosier arrested appellant, Billy, and Gary 
for assault, advising them again of their Miranda rights, and 
released John Poteet (Tl. 154, 190, 359-360, 399, 479). 
David did not call for an ambulance. He assumed that the 
E.M.T.'s who drove the ambulance were unavailable, otherwise 
he would not have been called to the scene (Tl. 257). 
4 Jones stated at trial that he remembers four assailants 
in his room at the time of the assault but remembers only the 
lhree persons at the emergency field identification by the 
pool fence (Tl. 292-294). 
Davis arranged for a co-worker of Jones to take Jones to the 
hospital in Panguitch, Utah just before 3:00 p.m. Novembet l, 
1981 (Tl. 155, 262-264, 429-410). 
Dr. E. Terry Henrie was Jones's attending physician 
at the Garfield Memorial Hospital in Panguitch, TJlah (Tl. 
419-420). He testified that when Jones was admitted to the 
emergency room, Jones was in a serious state. He had blood on 
his face, hair, and beard. His face and left eye were 
bruised. Both of his ears wen: bruised and very lender. He 
had a small skull fracture, and he was somnolent--he had 
difficulty concentrating (Tl. 4W-421, 428, 43l-432). ,Jones 
knew who he was, but not where he was or what the date was 
(Tl. 4 22, 4 39) • 
Dr. Henrie diagnosed Jones as having suffered a 
concussion and a contusion of the brain (Tl. 423). Dr. Henrie 
testified at trial that Jones was in danger of death by 
aspiration of his vomit while unconscious (Tl. 424). Dr. 
Henrie further testified that Jones's injuries were blood 
trauma caused by a beating with a fist, foot, or knee rather 
than a sharp object, and that these injuries were compatible 
with, and in his opinion caused by, an assault such as the one 
alleged by Jones (Tl. 4 27-4 28). 
During the first week of November, 1981, sever:al of 
Jone's co-workers were very upset by the assault and 
threatened to take the law into their own hands (T2. 81). 
There was talk of "blanket parties " (restraining a person in 
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a blankel wh.i.le healing him) and of running the Poteets out of 
Escalanle (T2. 80-82, 105-106, 109, 112-113). Significantly, 
however, i l appears f com lhe record that none of the Poteets 
were ever direclly lhrealened (T2. 107, 109-110, 114). 
Moi:eover, Officer Mosier lestified that the intense feelings 
in lhe communily soon subsided when il was seen that he was 
laking care of the matter (T2. 82). 
Jones was discharged from the hospital on November 
10, 1981 (Tl. 286, 425-426). Dr. Henrie testified that upon 
release Jones was free of pain but his mentation and memory 
were slill impaired. Jones was unable upon release to compute 
correclly "serial sevens" (successive subtraction of the 
number "7" from the resulting difference of the previous 
calculation, beginning with the number "100"). Jones also was 
unable to remember events prior to November l, 19Al (Tl. 426). 
At trial, Jones testified that his memory was still "spotty" 
(Tl. 28 7). 
At the December 10, 1981 Preliminary Hearing, 
appellant, Gary, Billy, and John Poteet5 were all bound over 
for trial and ordered to appear for arraignment on January 7, 
1982 (T2. 74-75, 90-91, 99; T3. fl-9, 14). All four were out 
on bail of $10,000.00 each (T2. 75; TS. 26). Just prior to 
Chrislmas 1981, Officer Mosier learned that appellant had 
moved his family from Escalante, ostensibly in response to 
1 John Poteet was later rearrested after his release at the 
emecgency field identification (Tl. 480). 
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the rumors of "blanket parties" which had in early 
November (T2. 75-77, 87, 92-93; T3. 15-19, 23; Rl. 45). 
Appellant failed to appear: at the JanuaLy 7, 1982 an·ai']nmenl 
heai:ing as oi:dei:ed and his bail was i:eset at. $200,000.00 (T2. 
92-93, 98-99; T3. 10,16; Rl. 20-21). The Galfield County 
Shei:iff's Department subsequently i:eceived an anonymous 
telephone tip that appellant was in Los Sanchus, California 
(T2. 77, 88, 93; T3. 10, 20-21). Appellant was arrested in 
San Luis Obisbo, California on January 13, 1982 (T2. RR, 94; 
T3. 10). He refused to waive extradition and was not returned 
to Utah until April 27, 1982 (T2. 78,88, 95; T3. 12). 
Meanwhile, Billy and Gary Poteet had jumped bail 
(Rl. 77-96). They did not appear at their May 6, 1982 
arraignment (Rl. 31, 36-37). At appellant's arraignment on 
the same Clay, appellant pled not guilty to charges of 
Aggravated Assault, Aggravated Robbery, and Attempt.ea Criminal 
Homicide and to the newly added charge of Bail Jumping (Rl. 
34). Billy and Gary were eventually arrested in Prosser, 
Washington, and were returned to Utah on May 25, 1982 ( Rl. 
79). 
On May 12, 1982, appellant filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, claiming, among other things, that he 
had been arrested without a warrant at his home, that he had 
not been afforded a Preliminary Hearing within the statutory 
30-day period (Rl. 41-47, 196-198). Appellant's petition was 
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dc:nied June 10, 1982 (Rl. 190, 195),6 On clune 13, 1982, 
appc:llant escaped feom jail (T4. 6-7, 10-12). 
On July 12, 1Q83, Billy, Gaey, and John Poteet all 
pled guilty to Attempted Aggravated Assault, a class A 
misdemeanor, pursuant to a plea haegain agreement ( Rl. 
99-106). In addition, Billy and Gaey also pled guilty to Bail 
Jumping, a thied degree felony (Rl. 99, 101, 103). All theee 
were placed on peobation (Rl. 113-118). One of the conditions 
of probation was that they would eetuen voluntaeily to Utah to 
testify against appellant upon appellant's appeehension and 
trial (Rl. 114, 116, 118). 
Appellant was subsequently aerested in Montana, and 
after fighting exteadition was finally eetuened to Utah on 
October 20, 1982 (T4. 10, 23). Since appellant's odginal 
counsel had withdeawn aftee negotiating the plea bargaining 
agreement foe Billy, Gaey, and John Poteet (Rl. 121-126), 
appellant appeaeed at the Novembee 4, 1982 headng without 
counsel (Rl. 125). At that heaeing the law fiem of Labeum and 
Taylor was appointed as appellant's new counsel (Rl. 125-126). 
On Decembee 9, 1982, a Peeliminaey Heaeing was held on the 
charges of Bail Jumping, Escape, and Injuey to a Jail, and 
appellant was bound over foe teial on each of the chaeges 
(T3. 1-26; T4. 1-28). 
6 Appellant's subsequent appeal to this Couet was 
"Jismissed for failure to state a cause foe eelief undee Rule 
6SA(f)(l), no unlawful resteaint having been alleged." Poteet 
v, Garfield County Attorney, Utah, (Case No. 18883, filecr----
Decernber 17, 1982)(Minute Entey). 
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On January 6, 1983, Appc-llant filen a motion to 
dismiss the Bail Jumping charge on the basis that a 
preliminary hearing on that count had not heen heln (Rl. 
158-159). The trial court denied the motion on January 16, 
1983, ruling that the motion was moot since a preliminary 
hearing had been held on the Bail Jumping on December 9, 1982 
( Rl. 163-164). 
On January 26, l9R3, appellant, through new counsel, 
again moved to dismiss for failure to hold a preliminary 
hearing within thirty days (Rl. 178). Appellant also filed a 
motion to suppress the emergency field identification on the 
basis that appellant had been arrested without a warrant (Rl. 
179-180). 
In addition, appellant sought to have the State bear 
the expense of transporting to trial appellant's brothers, 
Gary and Billy Poteet, residing in Grandview, Washington, and 
appellant's wife, Darliss Poteet, residing in Missoula, 
Montana (Rl. 185-188). In February of 1983 appellant prepared 
an affidavit of impecuniosity to the effect that he was unable 
to pay the per diems and mileage of his relatives, that 
counsel advised him that the evidence of his brothers was 
material to his defense of self-defense, and that he could oot 
safely proceed to trial without them (Rl. 192-193). This 
affidavit, however, was not filed with the court until the day 
of trial and had not been subscribed before a notary public 
(Tl. 25). 
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On February 18, 1983, appellant filed an Affidavit 
of Bias and Prejudice against the Honorable Don v. Tibbs on 
Lhe ground that Judge Tibbs had denied appellant's petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus in a hearing held June 10, 1982 
(Rl. 194-199). The Honorable Allen B. Sorenson found the 
affidavit insufficient in several particulars and denied the 
application for disqualification of Judge Tibbs (Tl. 10; Rl. 
200). 
Appellant's trial was held February 28, 1983 and 
March 1, 1983 on the charges of Aggravated Assault, Aggravated 
Robbery, and Attempted Criminal Homicide (Tl. 5-6). Before 
trial proceedings began, the trial court ruled on appellant's 
pretrial motions. The trial court denied appellant's motion 
to dismiss for failure to hold a preliminary hearing within 
thirty days, ruling that the issue was moot (Tl. 17).7 The 
trial court also denied appellant's motion to suppress, ruling 
that exigent circumstances existed, justifying the warrantless 
arrest of appellant (Tl. 18, 346-349). 
The trial court also refused to transport 
appellant's out-of-state relatives to trial at State expense 
because appellant's brothers had agreed as a condition of 
probation to return voluntarily to testify at appellant's 
trial that appellant had been the instigator of the assault 
(Tl. 20-25, 489-492). The trial court also noted that 
1 Appellant made the same motion at the March 11, 1983 Bail 
Jumping trial, and the trial court again denied the motion 
( T2. 4-6). 
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appellant had not establishecl that the testimony of his wife 
and brothers was material to his defense and that since they 
were relatives of appe::.lant, appellant shou::.d at range fot 
their presence if their testimony was material (Tl. 23-24). 
After the trial court hacl denied the motion, appellant 
submitted his affidavit of impecuniosity relating to the 
motion for compulsory process for his out-of-state relatives, 
The trial court ordered the affidavit filed, but let stand his 
order denying the requested compulsory process on the ground 
that the filing of the affidavit was not timely (Tl. 25). 
The jury found appellant guilty of Aggravated 
Assault (Tl. 547; Rl. 244-246, 260, 262). In a separate jury 
trial helcl March 11, 1983, appellant was found guilty of Bail 
Jumping (T2. 136; R2. 64). For each of the above convictions, 
appellant was sentenced on March 31. 1983 to serve consecutive 
terms of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison and 
to pay a fine of SS,000.00 (Rl. 268; R2. 37). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS 
TO SECURE, AT STATE EXPENSE, THE 
ATTENDANCE OF APPELLANT'S RELATIVES WHO 
WERE RESIDINS OUT OF STATE. 
Appellant claims the tria::. court erced in refusing 
to secuce, at State expense, the attendance at trial of 
appellant's brothecs Billy and Gacy Poteet, who were cesirling 
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out of state. Appellant contendR that their testimony was 
essential to establish appellant's defense of self-defense and 
the community atmosphere that oslensbily lead to appellant's 
]Umping bail. 
It must be noted at the outset that appellant never 
filed a pi:oper motion under the "Uniform Act to Secure the 
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal 
Pi:oceedings" (Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-1 through 5 (1953), as 
amended) which is the process by which out-of-state witnesses 
are obtained to testify in criminal trials. He merely filed 
what. was captioned a "Motion for Subpoenas" under Utah Code 
Ann.§ 77-35-14 (1953), as amended, which is the local 
subpoena rule of the Code of Criminal Procedure which, of 
coui:se, is limited to compelling" the attendance of a witness 
from anywhere in the state." (Section 77-35-14(e)) (emphasis 
added) (Rl. 185-188). This motion made no request that the 
defense witnesses be obtained at State expense. After this 
motion was denied, appellant waited until the first day of 
trial and filed an affidavit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
21-5-14 (1953), seeking an ordei: of the court to subpoena 
his defense witnesses at State expense (Rl. 192-193; Tl. 25). 
Again, this statute is not the procedural vehicle for securing 
the attendance of out-of-slate witnesses. Moreover, 
appellant's affidavit lacked a specific date and was not 
notacized (Rl. 192-193). Thus, appellant's own failures to 
ptoperly and timely apply for an order to obtain the 
attendance of his out-of-state witnesses, and to obtain them 
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at State expense justifies the action of the lowet cou,t 
denying appellant's cequest. 
A defendant has a constitutional right to 
pcocess, but that right is not absolute. State v. Peyton, R 
Oc. App. 479, 493 P.2d 1393 ( 1972). The gi:anting oi: denial rif 
an application for compulsoi:y process fo.- out-of-state 
witnesses is within the sound disc.-et ion of the court. Utah 
Code Ann.§ 77-21-3 (1982); People v. Rich, 313 N.W.2d 364 
(Mich. App. 1981); State v. Ivory, 609 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App. 
1980). Disccetion is abused only where no reasonable man 
would take the view adopted by the trial court, Jankelson v. 
Cisel, 3 Wash. App. 139, 473 P.2d 202 (1970), ot where the 
tcial court in view of all the ciccumstances acts acbitrat:ily 
and exceeds the bounds of ceason, i:esulting in substantial 
injustice. Poi:tec v. Poi:tec, 473 P.2d 538 (Mont. 1970). 
Unde.- the ciccumstances of the instant case, the tcial court's 
i:efusal to ocder the attendance of appellant's out-of-state 
witnesses at State expense was not an abuse of disci:etion. 
The tcial court denied appellant's cequest 
because Billy and Gacy Poteet had both agreed, as a condition 
of pcobation, to ceturn voluntarily to testify at appellant's 
trial that appellant had been the instigate.- of the assault 
(Tl. 492; Rl. 114, 116). Thus, their testimony would hardlv 
be characterized as "material" to the defense. The ti:ial 
court also reasoned that since they were appellant's 
brothers, appellant should arrange for their attendance at 
trial if their testimony was indeed material to his defensr:e 
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23-24). Implicit in the tcial court's culing is the 
assumption that a defendant's relatives have a vital interest 
in the defendant's case and thus are not unduly burdened by 
having to pay transportation and other expenses related to 
their attending trial to testify on the defendant 1 s behalf. 
In the instant case appellant's brothers not only would not 
have been unduly bur<'lened by having to attend trial at their 
own expense, but also had an affirmative duty to do so under 
the terms of their probation--albeit to testify in behalf of 
the state. 
Utah Code Ann. 21-5-14 (1953) provi<'les that no 
witness for a defendant in a criminal case shall be subpoenaed 
al State expense except upon court order, and such court order 
shall be made only upon affidavit of the defendant showing (1) 
that the defendant is impecunious, ( 2) that counsel has 
advised the defendant that the witnesses' testimony is 
material to his defense, and (3) that the defendant cannot 
safely proceed to trial without the witnesses. Appellant 
prepared such an affidavit dated "February, 1983" (the 
specific date was not listed) (Tl. 25; Rl. 192-193), but the 
affidavit was not subscribed by a notary public, and was not 
filed with the court until the day of trial after the trial 
court had already denied appellant's "Motion for Subpoenas" as 
to appellant's out-of-state witnesses (Tl. 25; Rl. 
185-188) .B 
8 Again, this prior motion had not requested that the 
out-of-state witnesses be obtained at State expense, it merely 
requested that they be obtained by subpoena. 
Appellant's filing of the was unlime.:.y. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetls, in Commonwealth 
v. Dirring, 354 Mass. 523, 23R N.E. 2rl SOR (1968), ruled that 
the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying Lhe 
defendant's tardy motion for compulsory process of 
out-of-state witnesses, where the mot ion was made on the fifth 
day of trial after the defendant had had approximately ten 
months in which to prepare for trial. In State v. Peyton, 
supra, the court upheld the denial of the defendant's motion 
for compulsory process of an out-of-state witness on the 
grounds that his filing the motion at the beginning of tria.:_ 
was untimely. The Peyton court also found that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's 
motion for continuance in connection with the request for 
compulsory process in light of the fact that the tria::. had 
already been continued on three occasions, al::. attributable to 
the defendant's acts. 
In the instant case, appel:!.ant included the names of 
his brothers in his Motions for Subpoenas (Rl. 185-lRfl), hut 
he did not file the requisite affidavit in support of his 
request for compulsory process for the out-of-stale witnesses 
at State expense until the beginning of trial (Tl. 25), anti 
never filed a motion under the Uniform Acl to Secure the 
attendance of out-of-state witnesses, (Section 77-21-1 el. 
seq., supra). The trial court was understandably unwilling lo 
further postpone the trial until appellant.'s bLothers cou.:.d be 
brought to Utah to attend the trial in light of the bcothers' 
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agi·eemenl to relurn voluntarily and the more than fifteen 
month delay from the time of the assault to the time of trial 
caused by appellant's jumping bail in December of 1981, and 
his escaping from jail in June of 1982 (Tl. 25). Thus, under 
the circumstances, and in accordance with Dirring and Peyton, 
ciced above, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to refuse to grant appellant's untimely application for 
an oi·der that appellant's brothers and wife be brought to 
trial al State expense. 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-5 (1953) 
provides that "an affidavit to be used before any court, judge 
or officer of this slate may be taken before any judge or 
clerk of any court of any justice of the peace or any notary 
public in this stale." Although the statute's language is 
permissive, it is well settled that an affidavit is a written 
statement, under oath, sworn to or affirmed by the person 
making it before some person who has authod ty to administer 
an oath or affirmation. 2A C.J.S. Affidavits § 2, pp. 
435-436; Halsy v. Pat Reichenberger Lumber, Inc., 5 Kan. App. 
2d 622, 621 P.2d 1021 (1981). Furthermore, "[I]n order to 
make an af f id av it, the re must be present at the same time the 
officer, the affiant, and the paper, and there must be 
something done which amounts to the administration of an 
oath." In re Education Association of Passaic, Inc., 117 N.J. 
Suµ-r. 25'), 2Fi7, 284 A.2d 374 (1971). See also 2A C.J.S. 
Affidavits § 30, p.465; Thompson v. Self, 197 Ark. 70, 122 
S.W.2d 182 (1938). 
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Thus, since appellant's afficlavil was nol made under 
oath before a person authorized lo lake such an affidavit, the 
affidavit is invalicl, and lhe trial cour·l pi:operly retusecl lu 
order that appellant's oul-of-slale witnesses be suhpoenaea at 
State expense. 
This Court deall with a i:elaled silualion in State 
v. Cox, 74 Utah 14q, 277 P. 972 ( 1929). The clefenclant in Cox 
presented an affidavit at trial supporting his request foe an 
ocdec that certain witnesses he subpoenaed at State expense. 
This Couct affirmed the tcial court's clenial of the demand on 
the grounds that cross-examination of the clefendant revealerl 
that he was in fact not unable to beac the expense of bringing 
the witnesses to the ti:ial and that the affidavit failecl to 
make the cequiste showing of materiality of the witnesses' 
testimony. 
In the instant case, although the tcial couct culed 
that appellant was impecunious (Tl. 24), the couct pcopedy 
denied appellant's request on the grounds that his bcothecs 
had an affirmative cluty to attend appellant's tcial under the 
teems of theic probation (Tl. 492; Rl. 114, 116). 
Fucthecmore, appellant's affidavit suffered nol merely from an 
insufficient showing of matecialily bul fcom complete 
invalidity since it was not made undec oath befoce a person 
authorized to take such an affidavit. 
Thecefoce, the tcial couct pcopecly denied 
appellant's demand. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF 
THE HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS WAS PROPERLY 
DENIED. 
Befoce tcial, appellant filed an Affidavit of Bias 
and Pcejudice against the Honocable Don V. Tibbs on the 
grounds that Judge Tibbs had previously denied appellant's 
ptetition for a wdt of habeas corpus (Rl. 194-199). In 
accordance with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Judge Tibbs referred the matter to the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorenson, who found the affidavit insufficient and denied 
appellant's motion to disqualify Judge Tibbs (Tl. 10; Rl. 
200). Appellant now objects for the first time that Judge 
Sorenson did not detail the reasons underlying this 
conclusion. Apparently, no attempt was made by the defense to 
ask Judge Sorenson for a clarification of the basis for his 
ord<=c. 
Appellant relies on Rule 52( a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Pcocedure, which requires that a court find the facts 
cpecifically and state sepacately its conclusions of law 
theceon in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury. But Rule 52(a) also provides that 
"findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on 
dtecisions of motion under Rule 12 or 5h or any other motion 
exc<opt as pcovided in Rule 4l(b)." 
An action is commenced by the filing of a complaint 
01 the service of summons (Rule 3), while a motion is an 
application foe an order (Rule 7(b)(l)). The filing of an 
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Affidavit of Bias and Pcejurlice ls essentially an appllcatinri 
foe an ocdec of disqualification. Thus, the filing nf an 
Affidavit of Rias and Ptejudice is a motion rather than an 
action, and Judge Sorenson's rleclsion need not be 
by findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Appellant. cites not. law to the Thet<=fore, 
it was not error foe Judge Sorenson to summarily deny 
appellant's motion. 
POINT III 
THE EMERGENCY FIELD IDENTIFICATION WAS 
PROPER. 
Appellant claims that he was denied du<= process of 
law by being subjected to an illegal line-up on Novemb<=r 1, 
1981 when Office Mosiec took him, his brothers, and his uncle 
to the Cir:cle "D" Motel to be identified by the victim. 
Appellant asser:ted an identical claim in a petition for habeas 
cor:pus celief, which was denied by the Sixth District Court in 
a hearing held June 10, 1982 (Rl. 195-196). This Court later 
upheld that denial. Poteet v. Garfield County Attorney, Utah 
(Case No. 18883, field December 17, 1982) (Minute Entry). 
Appllant was not subjected to a line-up at the 
Ciccle "D" Motel. Rather, it was an emergency fie.!.d 
identif icat.ion, Consequently, the statutes governing 
line-ups, cited by appellant in his bcief, are inapposit<= to 
the ci ccums tances of the instant case. State v. Allen, 29 
Utah 2d 442, 511 P.2d 159 (1973). 
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In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that "a claimed violation of due 
ptocess of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding it Id. 
at 302. Because in Stovall one of the assailant's victims was 
dead and the other critically injured, and feared to be close 
to death, the Court held that the confrontation was ceasonable 
under the circumstances. 
The ciccumstances of the instant case ace cemackable 
similar. The victim, Rodney Jones, when discoveced, had a 
weak pulse fcan the loss of so much blood; his bceathing was 
shallow; and he faded in and out of consciousness (Tl. 330, 
343-345, 386, 406). Officec Mosiec feaced that Jones might 
not live (Tl. 343-345). Thus, undec the ciccumstances, it was 
impecative that Officec Mosiec allow Jones an immediate 
oppoctunity to confcont and identify the suspects Jones had 
named. 
Appellant acgues that the eighteen houc delay fcom 
the time of the assault to the time of the confcontation 
mitigates against characterizing the confcontation as an 
emergency field identification. Appellant cites no authodty 
for his pcoposition. Fucthecmoce, he and the othec thcee 
suspects we ce bcough t to the C ice le "D" Motel within an houc 
oi two of the time that Jones was discoveced in his coom {Tl. 
144, 159, 171. 333). Thus, the confcontation was conducted as 
soon as ceasonably possible under the circumstances, and 
appellant's rights wece not infcinged. 
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POINT IV 
THE TIME FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING ON THE 
CHARGE OF BAIL JUMPING WAS EXTFJHJF:f) POR 
GOOD CAUSE. 
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of 
law because he was not afforded a preliminary hearing on the 
chacge of Bail Jumping until December: 9, 1982. 
In December: of 1982, aflec his pceliminary heatcing 
on the charges of Aggcavated Assault, Aggravated Robber·y, and 
Attempted Criminal Homicide, appellant moved his family ftcom 
Escalante, Utah to Califocnia (T2. 75-77, 87, 92-93; T3. 
15-19, 23; Rl. 45). Consequently, appellant failed to appear 
as ocdered at his January 7, 1982, arraignment hearing (T2. 
92-93, 98-99; T3. 10, lf;). On January appellant was arrested 
in San Luis Obisbo, California (T2. 88, 94; T3. 10). 
Appellant fought extradition and was not returned to Utah 
until April 27, 1982 (T2, 78, 88, 95; T3. 12). 
On May 8, 1982, appellant was arraigned on the 
original three charges and a new charge of Bail Jumping (Rl. 
34-35). Appellant plea "Not Guilty" to all four charges (Rl. 
34). 
On June 13, 1982, only three days aft.etc his petition 
foe a writ of habeas corpus had been denied (Rl. 190, 195), 
appellant escaped from jail (T4. 6-7, 10-12). Appellant was 
later: discovered in Montana and after again fighting 
extcadition, was finally returnecl to Utah on October 20, 1982 
( T4 • 10 , 2 3) • 
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At a November 4, 1982 hearing, new counsel for 
appellant was appointed (Rl. 125-127). At that hearing the 
also nirected that any request for preliminary hearing 
on the three new charges of Bail Jumping, Escape, and Injuring 
a Ja.i.l should be referred to the Circuit Court (Rl. 125). on 
December 1, 1982 appellant moved to dismiss the Bail Jumping 
chai:ge on the grounns that he had not been afforded a 
pi:e:iminary hearing on that charge (Rl. 158-159). The 
preliminary hearing on the Bail Jumping charge was held on 
December 9, 1982 (T3. 1-26; T4. 1-28). Consequently, at the 
January 6, 1983 hearing on the motion to Clismiss and other 
motions, the trial court ruled that the matter was moot (Rl. 
163-164). Appellant's subsequent motions to the same effect 
were denied on the same grounds (Tl. 17; T2. 4-6). 
Unde c the ci rcurnstances, appellant was not denied 
due pi:ocess of law. By pleading to the Bail Jumping charge at 
the May 8, 1982 arraignment hearing, appellant implicitly 
waived a preliminary hearing on that charge. State v. 
Gustaldi, 41 Utah 63, 123 P. 897 (1912); Pope v. Turner, 30 
Utah 2d 286, 517 P.2d 536 (1973).8 
8 Although, in contrast to the circumstances in Gustaldi and 
Pope, appellant moved before trial to dismiss the Bail Jumping 
chai:ge foe failure to hold a preliminary hearing on that 
charge, the trial court in all likelihood considered the 
to be a request for such a hearing in accordance with 
the coui:t's discretion at the November 4, 1982 hearing. 
Significantly, appellant did not object to the failure to hold 
a pteliminary hearing until nearly eight months after pleading 
lo the Bail Jumping charge, and once he raised the objection 
he was afforded a hearing within ten days. 
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Even assuming that appellant did not waive the 
preliminary hearing, the preliminaty heating was continuPd fa, 
good cause as provided fot in Utah Code Ann. 77-37-7(4)(cl. 
The delay from the May 8, 1982 hearing at which appellant was 
first charged with Bail Jumping to the December 9, 1982 
preliminary hearing on that charge was due primarily to 
appellant's escape from jail on June 13, 1982. 
This Court in State v. Bradshaw, Utah (Case Nos. 
18255 and 18430, filed February 9, 1984), ruled that a l70-day 
delay in the holding of a preliminary hearing was not an abuse 
of the "good cause" ex tens ion since the delay was the resu::.t 
of the defendant's own actions and concerns. In the case at 
bar, the delay was likewise a result of appellant's actions 
and conduct. 
Thus, there was good cause to extend the time for 
the preliminary hearing, and the resulting delay did not deny 
appellant's right to due process of law. 
POINT V 
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT AT HIS 
RESIDENCE WAS PROPER. 
Appellant contends that under Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573 (1980), Officer Mosier's arrest of appellant 
without a warrant at his place of reside nee was improper, and 
thus all evidence of the line-up identification and follow,ng 
processes should have been suppressecl by the trial court. 
-28-
Appellant moved to suppi:ess this evidence on the 
same grounds befoi:e ti:ial (Rl. 179-180). The ti:ial coui:t 
denied the motion on the gi:ounds that exigent cii:cumstances 
existed, justifying the wai:i:antless ai:i:est (Tl. 18, 346-349). 
Appellant's i:eliance on Payton is misplaced. When, 
as in the instant case, the pei:sons to be ai:i:ested answei: the 
dooc or come outside the cesidence, no warant is required 
because thece has been no entry of private premises. United 
States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1981); Waldrop v. 
State, 424 So.2d 1345 (Ala. Cr. app. 1982); People v. Morgan. 
113 Ill.App. 3d 543, 447 N.E.2d 1025 (19A3); LaFave, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE§ 6.1 (Supp. 1984). 
Thecefore, since appellant and his co-suspects all 
voluntacily came outside theii: residence, the later 
warrantless arrest was proper, and appellant's motion to 
suppcess was propei:ly denied. 
Even assuming that a warrant was required to arrest 
appellant and the others outside their home absent exigent 
ciccumstances in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Payton, such exigent cirucmstances existed in the case at bar. 
The victim had been seriously injured and was feared to be 
close to death or losing consciousness (Tl. 343-345). Officer 
Mosiei: hacl probable cause to believe that appellant, his 
brothers, and his uncle had committed the assault since the 
victim named them as his assailants (Tl. 329, 349, 360). 
Finally, Officer Mosier believed that appellant and the other 
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Poteets wece tcansienls living in Escalante only temporarily 
(Tl. 343-345; TS. 11). 
Thus, undec lhe ciccurnstances, it woulrl have heen 
unceasonable lo cequice that Officer Mosier· obtain a warrant 
in ocdec lo accesl appellant anrl the his r·elatives so that he 
could take them to the Cii:le "D" Motel foi: the emecgency field 
identification. Thecefoce, the lr:-ia1 cour:-t's nenial of 
appellant's motion to suppi:ess was also pi:opei: under this 
analysis. 
POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCF. ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CONVICTION. 
Appellant contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to suppor:-t his conviction of Aggi:avaled Assault 
since the pcosecution pr:-oduced no evidence that appellant used 
a deadly weapon in the assault. 
This Coui:l has used the fo1lowing standar:-d of review 
in considecing a challenge lo the sufficiency of the evidence: 
This Coucl will nol lightly ovectui:n lhe 
findings of a jui:y. We must view the 
evidence pi:opecly pi:esented al li:ial in 
the light most favoi:able to the jucy' s 
vecdict, and will only intei:fei:e when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a i:easonable man could not possibly 
have ceached a vei:a ict beyond a i:easonble 
doubt. We also view in a light most 
favocable to lhe jui:y's vei:dict those 
faults which can be i:easonably infer:-r:-ed 
fr:-om the evidence pi:esentea to it. 
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Slale v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, <l45 (1982) (citations 
ommitled). 
Appellant was convicted of Aggravated Assault in a 
juty trial held February 28, 1983 and March 1, 1983 (Tl. 5-6). 
There are two elements to the offense: first, under Utah Code 
Ann. Ii; 76-5-102 (1978), there must be either "(a) [a]n 
attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury 
to another; or (b) [a] threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another" 
(emphasis added); and second, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(l978), the assailant must either "(a) ••• intentionally 
cause ] serious bodily injury to another; (b) ••• use 
[ ] a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury" (emphasis added). The 
information charged the offense under theory (a) of Section 
76-5-103 (Rl. 154), a theory which appellant does not even 
challenge on appeal. Even so, under the disjunctive wording 
of the statute, lack of evidence as to use of a deadly weapon 
in the assault is not necessary to sustain a conviction of 
Aggravated Assault. Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial 
was more than sufficient to establish that appellant 
attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to the victim, Rodney Jones, and that appellant either 
intended to cause Jones serious bodily injury or used such 
rnc:ans or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury. 
-31-
Appellanl and lhe olhet Poleets were seen enlc-ting 
Jone's motel room on lhe aflernoon ot the assault (Tl. 140, 
218-219, 322-323, 367). They were later heard to say, " We 
God Damn sure tore lhat room up, TV and all" (Tl. 240-248). 
Jones was discovered the next mor·nin'] in his molel room 
unconscious, batlered, and covered wilh blood (Tl. 141, 159, 
171-172). Jones named and identified appellanl as one of his 
assailants (Tl. 289, 329, 339, 349, 358, 360). 
Appellant finally claims, that the evidence <lid not 
establish that Jones sustained a serious bodily injury as 
defined in Ulah Code Ann. 76-1-601(9) (miscited by 
appel.:.ant), which slates that "'Serious bodily injury' means 
bodily injury that creales or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ or creates a substanlial risk of 
death." 
The evidence established lhat the assault 
Jones unconscious for approximately eighteen hours (Tl. 282, 
363, 422). His face, ears, and left eye were bruised, ancl he 
had a small skull fracture (Tl. 420-421, 428, 431-432). Dr. 
Henrie, Jones's attending physician, teslified that Jones hac 
suffered a concussion and a conlusion of the brain, and that 
Jones was somnolent (Tl. 422-423, 439). Dr. Henrie fucther 
testified that Jones had been in danger of death by aspiratior; 
of his vomit while unconscious (Tl. 424). Finally, Jones's 
mentation and memory were seriously impaired by the assault 
(Tl. 287, 422, 426, 439). 
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The above evidence amply supports the conclusion 
that Jones's injury either caused a protracted impairment of 
his mEontation and mEomory or crEoated a substantial risk of 
dEoath. Thus, th" EovidEonc" was sufficient to support 
apfl"llant's conviction of Aggravated Assault. 
CONCLUSION 
For the abov" stated reasons, appellant's 
convict ions should be affirmed. 
1984. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of March, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. !)()RIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I heceby cecti fy that I mailed a tt·ue and exact copy 
of the focegoing Bcief, postage pcepaid to James L. Shumate, 
attocney foe appellant, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah 
--K--
84720-0623, this __,___day of Match, l9R4. 
